I. INTRODUCTION

B
y design, tax increment financing (TIF) involves a delay between the redevelopment costs paid and the project benefits received. Because of the mismatch between the time of incurring development costs and the receipt of benefits of greater property or sales tax revenues associated with economic development, TIF naturally lends itself to the use of debt finance. Over the last several decades, many local governments have used debt instruments to securitize future tax revenues in order to pay for current costs related to the economic development of the TIF district (Johnson, 1999) . Such securitization often involves the selling of securities in the U.S. municipal bond market. However, the financial crisis of [2007] [2008] greatly affected the use and structure of the municipal securities market (Johnson, Luby, and Moldogaziev, 2014) . In addition, the financial crisis deflated the value of one of the primary repayment pledges of these TIF securities in most areas of the United States, namely the local property tax base. For example, the city of Louisville, Kentucky recently nearly defaulted on its 2006 TIF bonds sold to finance the KFC Yum! Center. TIF property tax revenues in 2012 amounted to $3.5 million with the expectation just a few years earlier that the TIF district would generate $8.2 million to pay the principal and interest payments on the bonds in 2012 (Boyd, 2013) . It is likely that the Great Recession's impact on property values significantly contributed to the shortfall between expected and realized TIF revenues in Louisville.
Given the extensive use of municipal securities to finance TIF capital projects over the last several decades and the changes in the municipal securities market and local property tax base as a result of the recent financial crisis, this paper explores the use of TIF debt finance before and after the Great Recession (i.e., during the period [2000] [2001] [2002] [2003] [2004] [2005] [2006] [2007] [2008] [2009] [2010] [2011] [2012] [2013] . We gather data about debt that is serviced through TIF and document changes in several variables related to the amount, use and structural features of such debt, focusing our analysis on the impact the Great Recession had on these variables. We also offer a brief discussion on the possible future of TIF debt finance in the post-Great Recession world.
II. TIF DEBT FINANCE MECHANICS
Before presenting data on the entire TIF industry from 2000-2013, this section of the paper briefly details the purpose and mechanics of TIF debt finance. Local governments generally use TIF debt finance, which often entails the sale of municipal securities, for three reasons (Johnson, 1999) . First, as mentioned above, the sale of municipal securities allows the local government to quickly raise a large amount of financial resources for TIF redevelopment projects. In the absence of municipal bonds, the local government would have to rely on loans from banks and/or developers or to significantly decelerate the pace of the redevelopment projects to be in line with annual increases in the tax base. In addition, municipal securities are generally tax-exempt so the local government receives the benefit of lower cost financing with municipal securities vis-à-vis bank or developer loans. Second, TIF debt allows municipalities to circumvent constitutional or statutory debt restrictions, since TIF bonds are generally not subject to general obligation bond debt limitations or public referendum requirements (Johnson, 1999; Briffault, 2010) . Thus, local governments can access redevelopment resources without seeking legislative and/or public approval. Finally, TIF provides local governments an opportunity to raise off-balance sheet capital financing since the issuer of TIF bonds, generally a redevelopment agency, is usually not considered part of the general government. This serves to preserve the local government's borrowing capacity for future capital projects. In essence, the basic pros and cons of pay-as-you-go financing versus pay-as-you-use financing are present in the decision to use TIF debt finance.
Local governments sell TIF bonds in the national municipal bond market. The prevailing feature of this market is tax exemption. That is, the interest on municipal securities is generally exempt from federal income taxation. However, federal tax regulations specify that in order to qualify for such tax exemption, at least 95 percent of the TIF bond proceeds must be used for redevelopment purposes in a "blighted" area, the issuer must have a redevelopment plan, and the pledge of repayment must be from general taxes of the government or from incremental taxes associated with the project (Johnson, 1999) . If these conditions are not met, the local government will incur higher interest costs as it will have to sell the debt on a taxable rather than tax-exempt basis. As it relates to amortization structure, local governments sell the debt with a bond structure that approximates the expected size of the future incremental tax revenues associated with the redevelopment. That is, the local government amortizes the TIF bonds over a time period during which incremental revenues are expected to be sufficient to pay the principal and interest payments on the debt.
In the parlance of the municipal bond market, TIF bonds essentially represent a hybrid general obligation/revenue bond credit structure (Geheb, 2009) . TIF debt appears to be general obligation in nature in that ad-valorem property taxes often secure repayment on the bonds. However, TIF debt also carries a revenue bond feature in that there is a specific, identifiable revenue repayment source (i.e., the incremental tax revenues) that would not exist in the absence of the redevelopment project. Moreover, redevelopment agencies, rather than the general government, are often the issuer of the TIF debt just as other types of government authorities are often issuers of revenue bonds. This hybrid structure has raised some constitutional issues related to the level of responsibility that the general government has in "making whole" TIF bond investors in the event of a default (Geheb, 2009 ). In the past, local governments have sold much (although not all) of their TIF debt using a revenue bond structure (Johnson, 1999) .
III. THE TIF MUNICIPAL SECURITIES MARKET, 2000-2013
In this section of the paper we discuss the data -the trends, use, and structure of TIF debt securities issued between January 1, 2000 and December 31, 2013 -with an emphasis on the impact of the Great Recession. This covers several years before and after the financial crisis of [2007] [2008] , including the years before and after the Great Recession. The database includes a list of all TIF debt securities sold during this time period (N = 2,478) as well as a spectrum of features of these bond transactions. The data for this descriptive analysis come from the Securities Data Corporation (SDC).
1 This is a fee-for-service database company that collects information on all municipal securities sales. Our review considers TIF market trends, the issuers and uses of TIF securities, and the structure of TIF securities. As such, the analysis provides a complete picture of the TIF municipal securities market over the last 14 years for the period January 2000 through December 2013. We assess the distribution of TIF securities issuance data for goodness-of-fit using Pearson's and log-likelihood Chi-squared tests of independence, which test the likelihood of whether the observed annual distributions for variables of interest in this study are due to chance or whether there are significant shifts in their annual distributions during the period under examination. The tests compare the observed distributions in the data to the expected distributions based on the assumption that the variables are independent. While these tests do not provide evidence of the direction of association between the variables of interest, in our case, they provide evidence on the probability of independence between each of our variables of interest and annual TIF bond issuance activity in 39 U.S. states and the District of Columbia.
A. TIF Market Trends
In the period, almost $37.6 billion in 2,478 separate TIF issues were sold in the municipal bond market. As seen Figure 1, The State of California has been the "market leader" in TIF securities, except in 2012. The dramatic decline in 2012 was a result of California's dissolution of its redevelopment authorities in late 2011, which prohibited California local governments from issuing any new TIF bonds (Lefcoe and Swenson, 2014) . California was a pioneer in the use of TIF debt finance and was perennially the largest seller of TIF bonds prior to the elimination in its redevelopment agencies. The steep drop between 2011 and 2012 in the volume and number of TIF transactions reflects this statutory change. In 2013 California returned as the largest issuer of TIF securities with 21 separate TIF issues for a combined value of $618 million. However, these municipal securities represented refinancing of existing TIF securities, which were allowed under Assembly Bill 1484. Refinancing of outstanding TIF securities was allowable as long as the amount of the refinancing bond issue was not greater than the amount of refinanced bonds, and the refinancing bond interest costs were less than refinanced bond interest costs.
2 In the period under study, California municipalities are directly responsible for over $25 billion in TIF securities, which is roughly about two-thirds of the entire TIF activity in the municipal securities market. A total of 59 municipal issuers from California appear to have delivered at least $100 million of TIF securities each to the market, with the San Jose City Redevelopment Agency leading the way with almost $2.5 billion in 20 separate TIF issues.
The data indicate a similar impact of the Great Recession on overall TIF debt finance activity even if California is removed from the database. As shown in Figure 2 , the largest and smallest volumes of non-California TIF issuance were in 2005 and 2012, respectively, with a sharp decline in TIF transactions and volume between 2007 and 2008 and a steady decline thereafter with an uptick in transaction frequency in 2013. Even after omitting California issuers, the measures of association between the number of TIF bond issues and the year of issuance provide evidence of statistically significant changes in issuance trends in our sample period. For the period from 2000-2013, Pearson's Chi-squared and log-likelihood Chi-squared statistics are 658.0 and 600.8, respectively. Aside from California, there are five states that have issued more than $1 billion each in TIF securities during the period under review. These states are Colorado, Missouri, Minnesota, Illinois, and Texas. In Figure 3 , we depict aggregate annual volumes in these top-five TIF issuing states for 2000-2013. Though overall Colorado leads the top-five list with about $1.6 billion, its municipalities are the least frequent market participants with only 41 separate TIF issues. Its biggest aggregate TIF issues of $296 million and $266 million 
B. Issuers and Uses of TIF Securities
Not coincidentally, issuers from California dominate the TIF market in the period. Of the 10 largest issuers of TIF securities (a combined volume of over $8 billion or over 20 percent of the entire industry in the period), eight are in California. By far the largest issuer of TIFs in the US was the San Jose Redevelopment Agency with almost $2.5 billion in TIF securities ( Table 1 ). The San Francisco City & County Redevelopment Agency issued over $1.1 billion during the same period. Three remaining major issuers in California were the Oakland Redevelopment Agency, the San Diego Redevelopment Agency, and the Riverside County Public Finance Authority -all with TIF volumes exceeding $600 million. These top-5 issuers in California accounted for about 8 percent of all TIFs in the state in 2001 and about 40 percent in 2009, with their shares in other years falling somewhere between these extremes. Nevertheless, despite the continued activity in the TIF market by San Francisco City & County-, Oakland-, and San Diego Redevelopment Agencies since the Great Recession, it is evident that most of the TIF activity for these top-5 California issuers occurred before the Great Recession.
As shown in Table 2 , apart from California jurisdictions, the Denver Urban Renewal Authority is the largest issuer of TIFs by volume in our sample. It issued more than $800 million in TIFs (or more than half of all TIF securities issued by Colorado municipalities), with $171 million sold as recently as 2013. Atlanta and Chicago are next with $657 million (more than 96 percent of TIF securities in Georgia) and $476 million (over 37 percent of the entire TIF issues in Illinois), respectively. Minneapolis and the Unified Government of Wyandotte County & Kansas City have sold $344 million and $270 million in TIF securities each. These latter two issuers accounted for a significant fraction of TIF securities from their states; about 26 percent for Minneapolis and over 76 percent for Wyandotte County/Kansas City. The Unified Government of Wyandotte County & Kansas City has not returned to the TIF market since 2005, however. When combined, these top-5 non-California issuers of TIF securities accounted for about 2 percent of all non-California issues in 2012, but about 40 percent in 2000.
We classify the over thirty categories of TIF debt uses identified in the data into seven broad categories. As Table 3 shows, general purpose/public improvements are by far the biggest share of the TIF market in our sample with about $20 billion in proceeds (or about 53 percent of all TIF volumes). Almost 80 percent of general purpose/public improvements TIF securities were issued before the Great Recession, however. Economic development and industrial development TIFs are next in volume. Over $13.5 billion were issued for these uses as TIF obligations. TIF proceeds for these three major 
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[ (5) Source: Securities Data Corporation uses accounted on average for 89 percent of all TIF securities in the municipal market. The TIF market has thus been predominantly a market for general purpose/public improvement and economic and industrial development projects. The remaining annual volumes (on average roughly 11 percent of all TIF debt proceeds) are used for transportation, housing, education and health, and utilities, with housing, both single and multifamily structures, adding up to more than $2 billion. Transportation uses, such as overland infrastructure, airports, and seaports, accounted for more than $1.6 billion of TIF proceeds. Education TIFs, and to a lesser extent healthcare related uses, absorbed about $330 million of debt proceeds. A very small fraction of the TIF market ($184 million in our sample) is related to water, sewer, and gas purposes, electric and public power purposes, solid waste and recycling uses, as well as hybrids of these.
The economic development category generally shows a steady decline in issuance volume for the period from 2000 to the Great Recession period. Increases in the general purpose/public improvement category initially offset this decline, but eventually decline between 2007 and 2008. After 2008, the economic development category increases while the general purpose/public improvement category continues to fall. While these category names are somewhat generic (especially "general purpose/public improvement") and one must use caution when drawing conclusions, the decline in economic development TIF bonds and the increase in general purpose/public improvement TIF bonds suggests that local governments no longer use TIF only for economic development but also to finance general governmental purposes. The uptick in economic development bonds after 2009 and the decline in general purpose bonds may be the result of demands by municipal bond investors for more specific details on the development projects being financed rather than loaning money for "general purpose projects" that are financed by incremental tax revenues. However, this conclusion is speculative and warrants further systematic analysis.
Another way to explore the use of TIF proceeds is to look at trends in the tax status of TIF securities. As stipulated in federal tax statute, typically at least 95 percent of the use of proceeds must be pledged for redevelopment purposes in a "blighted" area to attain tax exemption. Thus, analyzing the composition of bonds sold tax-exempt versus taxable may provide more insight into the purposes that local governments have used TIF debt, that is, whether local governments have expanded their use of TIF debt finance tools to fund redevelopment in non-blighted areas or not. Figure 4 illustrates the volume and percentage of TIF bonds sold on a taxable basis. For most years between 2000 and 2014, local governments consistently sold their TIF debt on a tax-exempt basis about 80 percent of the time with the heaviest use of taxable TIFs in 2010, 2011, and 2013. However, the overall volumes of taxable bonds dropped dramatically since the Great Recession (i.e., taxable bond volumes in each year post-recession were less than half of the immediately pre-recession year levels). Private activity TIFs generally are sponsored by corporate sponsors and are almost always taxable securities. However, during the time period analyzed, only $347 million of TIF issues (less than 1 percent of the entire TIF market) were directly linked to corporate supporters as seen in Figure 5 . Most of these were tied to pre-Great Recession years when private funds were still relatively abundant. Our data show that the frequencies of issues for taxable and corporate-backed TIFs have decreased significantly, with Pearson's Chi-squared and log-likelihood Chisquared statistics at 57.0 and 56.6 compared to 17.8 and 17.6 respectively.
C. Structure of TIF Securities
The overall volume of TIFs has decreased since the Great Recession and so did average bond issue sizes. Mean bond sizes peaked in 2005-2007 and decreased significantly by 2012 as reported in Figure 6 . However, Figure 6 shows a larger average bond size in 2013. Another typical measure of bond structure, length of maturity, is generally positively related to risk, with investors demanding a higher risk premium for longer term investments or generally deciding to avoid longer-term investments altogether in extreme circumstances. In this context, one might expect to see the average final maturity decline in the years after the Great Recession as TIF bonds became riskier in light of the financial crisis and its effect on property values. The results in Figure 7 show a decline in 2009, an increase back to pre-recession levels in 2010 and 2011, and then a significant decline in 2012 and 2013. However, one needs to be careful in drawing any definitive conclusions from final maturity data without looking at times-to-call measures. As the measure of average years to call in The coupon interest rate sets the periodic interest payments on local governments' TIF bonds. In higher interest rate environments, coupon interest rates are generally higher and in lower interest rate environments, they are generally lower. However, the coupon interest rate is not the same as the yield that investors will receive (issuers will pay) because it does not take into account call provisions or the price of the securities. In Figure 9 the average highest coupon increases after 2007, and moves downward in 2012. This is especially interesting because interest rates generally declined after 2007 as a result of the financial crisis, as the Federal Reserve Bank cut its benchmark interest rate several times and continued to maintain low interest rates well into 2014. If there was not an interest rate risk premium that investors were building into TIF bond interest rates, we would expect to see the average highest coupon rate decline after 2007 in line with the general decline in interest rates. In fact, the average highest coupon rate is materially larger in the four years after the financial crisis (2008) (2009) (2010) (2011) than the three years previous to the financial crisis when interest rates were generally higher. This lends some support to the notion that TIF bond investors may have viewed such securities as relatively risky and thus demanded higher interest rates after the Great Recession.
Many local governments sell their TIF debt as revenue bonds with repayment solely payable from the incremental tax revenues generated in the TIF district (Johnson, 1999) . However, some local governments sell TIF debt using a general obligation bond structure whereby repayment is ultimately backed by the full faith and credit of the general taxing body. Due to this more robust repayment pledge, investors generally view general obligation bonds as less risky than revenue bonds. One might expect that local governments would increase the sale of TIF debt using a general obligation bond structure rather than a revenue bond structure in the years during and after the Great Recession. In Figure 10 , we observe that immediately before the Great Recession the share of general obligation TIF securities was between 2 and 5 percent, and the by early 2000s it was between 7 and 11 percent. Since the financial crisis, however, the share of general obligation TIFs increased to as high as 27 percent. It appears that TIF issuers are relying on their full faith and credit in more debt issues after the recession than on issues before the recession. We see statistically significant changes in the number of general obligations TIFs in the market, with corresponding Pearson's Chi-squared and log-likelihood Chi-squared statistics at 53.8 and 53.4. Of course by pledging their general obligation credit for TIFs, municipal issuers are reducing their debt issuing capacity for non-TIF issues.
The method by which local governments sell their bonds -negotiated or competitive -is an indicator of whether local governments are using financial intermediaries to resolve information asymmetries. In a negotiated bond sale, a local government works directly with a pre-selected underwriter to pre-market and market their bonds tailoring the bond structure to market conditions and investor demands. In a competitive sale, local governments sell their bonds to an underwriter or group of underwriters via an open auction with the lowest bidder receiving the bonds. Among other things, previous research has shown that the additional certification provided by underwriters in a negotiated bond sale can be advantageous (i.e., it can lead to lower interest costs compared to competitive sales) when there is significant volatility in the bond markets (Leonard, 1994; Kriz, 2003; Peng and Brucato, 2003) . The financial crisis of 2007-2008 created more volatility in the capital markets than in any other period in decades. With such volatility, all else equal, we might expect an upward spike in negotiated sales of TIF bonds. The TIF market was dominated by negotiated sales even before the crisis, but significantly more deals relied on negotiated sales since then. As shown in Figure  11 , since 2009 at least 87 percent of TIF securities have been sold in negotiated deals, except for the anomalous year 2012 when California withdrew from the TIF market. This shift is statistically significant as the Pearson's Chi-squared and log-likelihood Chi-squared statistics are equal to 53.9 and 52.9. Prior research has also shown that the use of financial advisors on a municipal security transaction can help deal with information asymmetries. These financial intermediaries help certify the true value of the municipal security and thus reduce the borrowing costs of issuers (Johnson, 1994; Vijayakumar and Daniels, 2006) . Based on this certification theory, we would expect the use of financial advisors on municipal TIF securities to increase after the 2007-2008 financial crisis in order to alleviate the information asymmetries that increased at this time. Figure 12 shows the percent of total TIF bonds that were sold without the use of a financial advisor. The share of TIF bonds issued without a financial advisor declined significantly between 2007 and 2009 and stayed low throughout the entire post Great Recession period, as compared to the much higher shares observed in the pre-recession period. It appears the local governments sought out this additional market certification more frequently after [2007] [2008] in light of the uncertainty created by the financial crisis. This conclusion is supported by highly significant Pearson's Chi-squared and log-likelihood Chi-squared statistics of 78.6 and 84.2.
With more volatility in the capital markets and the collapse of credit enhancement tools for TIF finance, better credit quality became important in the post-recession years. Figure 13 tracks the percentage of TIF bond issues rated by at least one of the three major credit rating agencies (Moody's, Standard and Poor's, or Fitch) from 2000-2012. Through their assignment of credit ratings, these agencies are financial intermediaries that attempt to relieve the information asymmetries between the issuer of bonds and investors especially with respect to the likelihood of default. Local governments seek credit ratings to relieve these informational asymmetries as a means of reducing their borrowing costs. Our results show that there was a general upward trend in the extent to which local governments sought credit ratings on TIF bond sales, which accelerated after the financial crisis. In the years immediately before the Great Recession, about 50 percent of TIF transactions were rated. In the years immediately after the Great Recession, almost 75 percent of TIF bond transactions received credit ratings. This upward trend is statistically supported by highly significant Pearson's Chi-squared and log-likelihood Chi-squared statistics of 62.2 and 59.0. This is likely a combination of local governments seeking additional certification of the value of their TIF bonds from a third party financial intermediary in the context of the greater financial uncertainty during these years and low credit quality issuers staying out of the market altogether.
One of the major calamities in the municipal market during the Great Recession was a collapse of the bond insurance industry. Of the nine active bond insurance firms before the crisis, only two survived the crisis (Moldogaziev, 2013; Johnson, Luby, and Moldogaziev, 2014) . Prior to the financial crisis, almost 60 percent of all new long-term municipal securities were insured by monoline bond insurers such as FSA, AMBAC, and MBIA (Moldogaziev, 2013) . As reported in Tables 4A (2000-2007) and 4B (2008) (2009) (2010) (2011) (2012) (2013) , we find that there is a general increase in the use of insurance from 2000-2007 with 54 percent of all TIF bonds insured in 2007. However, there was dramatic decline in insured TIF bonds starting in 2008 (only 28 percent insured), which continued through 2012. In 2013, the share of insured TIFs increased to 34 percent; nevertheless, it is unlikely that bond insurance penetration in the market will achieve pre-crisis levels. Thus, while we would have expected to see an increase in insured TIF bonds after the Great Recession as a means of mitigating investor concerns about bond default, such credit enhancement is not as widely and cheaply available in the capital market as it used to be prior to the Great Recession. As the relationship between the frequency of insured TIF securities and the year of issuance suggests (Tables 4A and  4B) , there has been a statistically significant shift in the distribution of insured securities in the market; the Pearson's Chi-squared and log-likelihood Chi-squared statistics are 317.9 and 381.0 respectively.
Another dramatic shift in the municipal market was the collapse of the variable rate bond market (Luby, 2012) . State and local governments generally have the ability to sell their debt on a fixed interest rate basis where the interest costs are set at issuance or on a variable rate basis where interest rates fluctuate over the term of the issue. With variable rate debt, state and local governments generally rely on credit enhancement devices such as bank letters of credit and liquidity facilities to successfully market the bonds over the life of the issue. Such credit enhancement became very scarce during and immediately after the financial crisis, which led to a significant upward spike in interest costs on these variable rate securities. This phenomenon is shown in our data in Tables 4A and 4B . It is clear that the volume of variable rate TIF securities shrunk dramatically after the Great Recession. More than 70 percent of all variable rate TIFs, or $1.9 billion in our sample, were issued in [2000] [2001] [2002] [2003] [2004] [2005] [2006] [2007] . This shift appears to be statistically significant, with Pearson's Chi-squared and log-likelihood Chi-squared statistics of 27.7 and 33.4, respectively. As mentioned above, variable rate bonds and short-term securities, in addition to bond insurance, would also often be accompanied by letters of credit and/or liquidity facilities. Though fluctuating before and after the Great Recession, the volume of TIFs using these two forms of credit enhancements fell after the crisis. As shown in Tables  4A and 4B , the largest volume of letter of credit and/or liquidity facility supported securities was issued in 2005, but they have been largely under-used in recent years. In this case as well, the shift in letter of credit and/or liquidity letter enhanced securities is statistically significant. Our estimated Pearson's Chi-squared statistic is 25.4, while the log-likelihood Chi-squared statistic is 25.6.
IV. DISCUSSION
The Great Recession clearly affected TIF debt finance activity by U.S. local governments. The volume and number of TIF municipal securities declined dramatically after 2007. This decline was seen across all states in both the number of annual transactions and bond volume. Annual TIF bond issuance is now less than half its size (as measured by annual number of transactions and volume) since its peak in the mid to late 2000s. In addition, the average transaction size of TIF bond issues has decreased since the Great Recession. This decline in TIF debt activity is most likely the result of California, the largest issuer of TIF bonds, slowing down its issuance activity after the recession and ultimately exiting the market, but may also be a result of other issuers using less TIF debt finance to fund their redevelopment projects given the actual or projected decline in growth of property tax increments in many parts of the country.
It appears the type of projects that TIF debt used to finance has also changed since the Great Recession. Economic development TIF projects rather than general-purpose TIF projects now constitute the great majority of TIF debt issued since the Great Recession. In addition, the post-Great Recession period has witnessed a total decline in corporate-sponsored private-activity TIF bonds. Our findings provide evidence that bond investors may be demanding more specificity in their investments. There is also evidence of a lack of available private capital for government development projects.
The TIF debt market experienced significant changes after the Great Recession with respect to the pricing, structure and sale process of these securities. Coupon interest rates increased and call maturities declined, reflective of a general increase in the perceived riskiness of TIF securities. Local governments increased their use of general obligation bond structures and independent financial advisors while more often seeking credit ratings on their TIF transactions as a way of mitigating the perceived increased riskiness of their municipal securities. Such actions to reduce information asymmetries were especially necessary as other risk mitigation tactics, such as seeking third-party credit enhancement, were not available to these local governments as the monoline municipal bond insurance market collapsed as a result of the financial crisis.
Given our findings regarding the impact of the Great Recession impact on TIF debt finance, can we speculate how this financial market will look in the future? Clearly, local governments will continue to sell TIF securities as shown by their continued issu-ance even during the recent global financial crisis. The market is likely to be smaller compared to its historical high since California local governments will be prohibited from selling TIF securities except for refinancing purposes. For example, the year 2012 witnessed an even more dramatic drop than the years immediately after the 2007-2008 financial crisis, as this was the first full year of California's TIF debt prohibition. The overall TIF municipal securities market may also be smaller if the cost of borrowing using TIF debt finance stays higher than other modes of financing since such additional interest costs will make redevelopment projects less feasible.
It is also likely that the structure and types of projects financed by TIF debt will change. Local governments appeared to attempt to strengthen the general credit characteristics of their TIF securities after the financial crisis. Such attempts will continue and could take the form of additional revenue pledges for bond repayment other than the tax increment, general obligation pledges for repayment in addition to the increment, greater use and size of debt service reserve funds, and higher debt service coverage ratios (i.e., the minimum ratio of expected tax increment revenues to debt service). Various market strategies related to financial intermediaries may also flourish, including the use of financial advisors and more reputable underwriters and the procurement of multiple credit ratings, to enhance the perceived credit of TIF debt. From the bond investor perspective, local governments probably should expect greater due diligence of the credit characteristics of their TIF securities, demand for more "seasoned" TIF districts, and greater scrutiny of feasibility analyses related to the TIF district. All of these strategies and demands emanate from the desire of the investor community for better and more carefully crafted TIF bond credits in an era of greater risk aversion with respect to the general credit of local governments.
V. CONCLUSION
Local governments have increasingly relied on the use of debt finance to raise upfront redevelopment resources in their TIF districts. While the Great Recession certainly "changed the face" of TIF debt finance, other factors such as the collapse of the monoline bond insurance industry and the dissolution of TIF districts in California contributed to the present state of TIF debt finance. With local governments in California mostly exiting the TIF municipal securities market and investors likely taking a cautious view of the issuers that remain in market, the future of TIF debt finance in the United States is uncertain. However, as long as many local government officials continue to believe that TIF is one of their only economic development tools, the financial market should remain active, albeit taking on a significantly different size and market structure.
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